... animals,1.1
I use the term other animals, since animals, if it is to be understood as a natural type, must necessarily include humans. The term animals, when used in such a way as to exclude humans, must be understood as equivalent to the term foreigners -- people whose only characteristic is that they do not belong to our nationality; they do not share any particular property that is not shared by our nationality. 
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... phenomena,1.2
In [9], Daniel Dennett gives examples of how `anectodal evidence' can be scientifically valuable. 
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... `panglossian'1.3
Dr. Pangloss is the Leibniz caricature in Voltaires Candide. R. Lewontin and S. J. Gould have used the term `panglossian' to characterise the adaptationist position in biology, which ignores non-adaptive features of evolution. 
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... history?1.4
This may affect the applicability of terms such as `rationality' and `language' eg. to killer whales, and to what extent, and in what way, we can regard them as moral and intelligent, beings with knowledge and understanding. A more extreme example is a creature from another planet, which behaves in an apparently intelligent and rational manner in most circumstances. A classic science fiction idea is the problem of deciding whether this is a robot or a rational living creature. 
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... world.1.5
This problem is also illustrated in two series broadcast on NRK (norwegian state broadcasting) in 1991/92: Viljen til liv (Will to life) and Dyriske sanser (Animal senses). The film makers have certainly done as much as possible to depict how the animals view us and the world, but the result is inevitably quite unrealistic. 
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... respectively.1.6
These two positions are clearly different -- behaviourism does not imply reductionist physicalism; rather the contrary. A pure behaviourist will be sceptical towards all attempts to find causes behind behaviour -- be they physical or mental. 
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... intentionality.1.7
Nagel does not wish to identify himself with phenomenology, but his sympathies appear to be leaning in that direction. 
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... `scientific'1.8
The english word science has a more restricted meaning than the scandinavian vitenskap (or german Wissenschaft), which also includes the social sciences and the humanities -- so some of the following statements appear less true in english than in scandinavian. Still, for lack of a better word i will use science as a translation of vitenskap. 
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... formation.1.9
This distinction is dubious or at least problematic also in more descriptive disciplines, as Kuhn, Feyerabend and others have pointed out -- but in these cases it can at least in practice be established. 
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... do.1.10
In this way, we eliminate both deliberate fraud and several other kinds of misunderstanding. Problems of this kind are also one of the main objections agains parapsychological research. 
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... rigid1.11
The rigidity of insects is well-known to anyone who has tried to let a fly out of a window. It is unable to learn that it cannot get through the (invisible) glass. 
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... otherwise2.1
Such a concept of cognition and knowledge has recently gained currency for quite unrelated reasons [13,14]. 
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... it.2.2
Jerome Bruner [6] calls these primitive schemata `affective categories' and their significance `affective meaning'. This shows that they are precursors to real categories, but they still belong to a distinct, lower stage. 
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... circumstances.2.3
This is also in accord with the ideal of the surroundings as the world seen from all possible perspectives -- this ideal is approached as cognition and experience grow richer. 
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... intelligence.2.4
We may be sceptical about the value of the latter -- is general intelligence something which it is at all possible to relate to one phenotype, or is it merely a concept encompassing a range of abilities which we find valuable or useful? Jerison himself takes an idiosyncratic attitude to this. 
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... lifeworlds.2.5
Jerison says, in the spirit of Kant and Uexküll, that the brain in its cognitive process creates a real world. 
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... them.2.6
Wittgensteins statement, `If a lion could speak, we would not understand it', would also be misplaced, since the lion does not possess the necessary biological prerequisites for speech or linguistic ability. I may also admit that Churchland has a point here. Although i consider `folk psychology' to be true for humans, on the grounds that it exists -- it is pragmatically or adaptively confirmed by evolution -- it is not necessarily valid for dolphins, since they may organise their mental states in completely different ways. 
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... counterpart,2.7
This means that i exclude unconscious deception and self-deception, except of the freudian variety. 
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... autonomy.3.1
Since Sartre denies that there is such a thing as human nature, he would have described it as a kind of `bad faith' -- we avoid responsibility for our actions by turning ourselves into `things'. 
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... nature?3.2
I have taken this argument from Mary Midgley, Freedom and Heredity [28, chap.2]; see also [28, chap.9]. 
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... argument.3.3
This means it is possible to claim that Kants concept of autonomy is less radical than that of Sartre. Sartre considers it as wrong to be slaves of reason as of any other part of our nature. He rejects the idea that we must defend our choices through rational argument. 
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... together.3.4
Mary Midgley argues for such a view of reason in The Objection to Systematic Humbug, in [28]. I do not know how correct she is in ascribing this view to Kant. According to Kant, reason does not work on a matter that is already moral, but is itself the source of all morality. 
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... egalitarian.3.5
Apparently too egalitarian -- it follows that the HIV virus has as much `right' to realise its telos as humans have. But talking about rights in this context is a category mistake. 
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... security.3.6
Acting out of enlightened self-interest may be better than many other kinds of acts or motives, but in itself it is morally neutral. 
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... exclusive3.7
See Mary Midgley [28, chap.9] for more on this. 
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... does.3.8
This confusion may also arise from unfortunate translations; cf. Haga [16, p.198]. 
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... general.3.9
`Irrational', destructive behaviour is not covered by this distinction; it cannot be construed as a simple antithesis to ethical forms of behaviour. A proper discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this essay. An interesting account is given by Mary Midgley [29, chap.8]. 
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... itself,3.10
This may be defended on the basis both of the fact that i have duties and responsibilities towards myself, not only towards others; and from a strong version of the cosmos thesis or the doctrine that the things are defined partly by their relations to other things. The argument goes that by having proper consideration for myself and realising my own nature, i automatically have consideration for all the rest of the world. Spinoza appears to be taking this stance. 
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... here.3.11
A readable introduction to this varied landscape is given by Barash [2, chap.5]. 
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... niche.3.12
This does not mean that they are defined into any particular rôle in the social system. Birds and mammals, as opposed to social insects, are generalists. In this respect, sociality differs from ecology. 
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... negative.3.13
It may also be that in our description of the phenomena, we are projecting a particular human, eg. patriarchal value system onto the animals [7, pp.88ff]. 
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... ok.3.14
By refusing to take proximate causes into account, we might however happen to misidentify phenomena. I will return to this problem in my discussion of altruism, section 3.4 -- here it is not so significant. 
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... there.3.15
This must not be understood as a primitivist demand that we return to this life form. It is, however, conceivable that industrial society must be radically transformed because it conflicts fundamentally with human nature -- that humans cannot live in it as humans. 
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... misunderstanding,3.16
The study of `altruism' in the sociobiological sense is of course still legitimate, although it loses some of its direct relevance to philosophy and ethics. 
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... it.3.17
We might expect altruism to be differentiated in favour of the nearest relatives, which i know well -- but then again we do have special responsibilities towards those closest to us! 
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... mind.3.18
As i indicated in section 2.1, all experience is imbued with meaning, so hardly anything is strictly neutral. However, the meaning of a particular phenomenon is primarily derived from its connection with the primary activities of life, which are the primary carriers of meaning. 
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... matter.3.19
It also requires an open, dynamical universe, where there is a difference between is and ought. 
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... network.3.20
Through this, our nature is also changed, and the learning process is not -- and will never be -- completed. 
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... considerations.3.21
We cannot refer to a principle of maximising inclusive fitness, since this has nothing to do with our intentions, only the function of the various adaptations. 
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